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Abstract
In 2014, the editorial board of BMC Medical Ethics came together to devise sections for the journal that would (a) give
structure to the journal (b) help ensure that authors’ research is matched to the most appropriate editors and (c) help
readers to find the research most relevant to them. The editorial board decided to take a practical approach to devising
sections that dealt with the challenges of content management. After that, we started thinking more theoretically
about how one could go about classifying the field of medical ethics. This editorial elaborates and reflects on the
practical approach that we took at the journal, then considers an alternative theoretically derived approach, and reflects
on the possibilities, challenges and value of classifying the field more broadly.
Introduction
In spring 2014, the Editorial Board of BMC Medical
Ethics were invited to discuss a reorganisation of the
journal into sections. The journal aims to publish
“original peer-reviewed research articles in relation to
the ethical aspects of biomedical research and clinical
practice, including professional choices and conduct,
medical technologies, healthcare systems and health pol-
icies”. The goal of the discussion was to devise sections
that would allow submission of as wide a range of rele-
vant articles as possible, but allowed submissions to be
classified in a way that was useful for editorial purposes
and comprehensible for authors and the readership. This
collective deliberation resulted in a classification of four
sections – each of which had specialist section editors
attached:
 Ethics in biomedical research
 Ethics in clinical practice
 Ethics in public health, medical law, and health
policy
 Methodology in bioethics
The approach taken was to divide the journal by areas
of research, resulting in broad sections covering both
theoretical and empirical approaches, such that an art-
icle submitted to a particular section would go directly
to the relevant section editor after initial processing. The
process and discussion was flexible, and the resulting
classification was essentially a very practical solution to
the challenges of managing the journal’s editorial process
and content, with no intention of saying anything about
the field in general. Given this, the sections used in the
journal are open to revision, and will be revised as and
when a better way to manage content is identified. In
addition, authors who do not feel that one of the existing
categories matches the content of their article can sub-
mit an article whilst leaving the decision about the sec-
tion open to the editors.
While the above classification is strictly limited to the
journal, the discussion about it also prompted a great
deal of thought about how a more substantive, theoretic-
ally driven classification of the field might be under-
taken, and demonstrated, for us, that there is no
obvious, commonly shared perspective on how to coher-
ently and adequately classify the various kinds of aca-
demic work that come under the very broad label
‘medical ethics’.
As we began to think more theoretically, it became
clear that whilst the model developed for BMC Medical
Ethics was the most appropriate and practical for the
journal, this model could certainly be challenged. Recog-
nising this, some of the journal editors were invited to
write this editorial, which reflects on the possibilities,
challenges, and value of classifying ‘medical ethics’. This
editorial, then, reflects on the practical approach that we
took at the journal and an alternative, theoretically de-
rived approach which might also be used for other pur-
poses (e.g., education, funding).
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Reflections on the practical approach for BMC Medical Ethics
By inviting the Editorial Board to participate in a discus-
sion on a suggested set of sections, listening to their sug-
gestions, and refining the ideas through discussion, the
resulting classification can be described as the result of a
deliberative and consensus-based approach. The value of
such an approach can be debated – and one of its weak-
nesses stems from the putative arbitrariness that can be
introduced by participants. The consensus reached de-
pends on who takes part, and the very process that leads
to a comprehensible and accepted consensus is also a
process that could lead to over simplification and reduc-
tion to the lowest common denominator, resulting at
worst in a failure to adequately cover the field, or per-
haps at best a compromise that might be acceptable to
many, but pleases few. A consensus approach can also
serve to simply reinforce existing norms, as it will tend
towards conservatism. However, the strengths of using a
practical, consensus-based approach to classification, in
this particular setting, are several, and outweigh these
concerns. First, those involved in a well-designed, delib-
erative process are likely to accept the resulting classifi-
cation as legitimate. This is a good way to establish
‘ownership’ with respect to the classification among the
editors. Moreover, the process of consensus finding
tends to result in a consensus that is comprehensible,
and so there would be no need for further simplified de-
scription of sections in a way that would be more easily
understood by authors and readers. Finally, as the edi-
tors in this particular setting can exercise judgment and
flexibility in where to direct the articles, the problem of
potential inadequacy in overall description of the field
does not present any problem in terms of what the jour-
nal ends up publishing. Additionally, if the sections be-
come, with time, unfit for purpose, they can be changed.
With regard to the process undertaken by the journal,
then, considering its purpose, these theoretically justified
worries about the deliberative consensus based approach
are mitigated.
In this editorial we want to draw attention to the
broader challenges of classifying the field of medical eth-
ics. We do so by exploring what a theoretical approach
to classifying medical ethics could look like. This ap-
proach can be described as ‘theoretical’ because we de-
rive conditions for classification from theoretical
considerations about the nature of the field. We will
provide pro- and con-arguments for this approach later
in the text. For now, we start by laying out some general
premises for the theoretically derived approach.
To classify the field of medical ethics for a practical
purpose (i.e., with view to what use the classification
will be put) is an example of ‘purposive classification’,
where items are grouped according to features that will
help achieve a specified aim. Given that our aim here is
to classify the field of medical ethics in way that will
enable it to be split up into discrete sections that will
be useful to journal editors, authors, funders, students,
and academic institutions, we need to take a very broad
and inclusive approach. In academic ethics, the obvious
purposive objects of classification are either activities
(i.e., ways of ‘doing’ ethics) or concerns (i.e., topics of
ethical interest) which are themselves interpreted, iden-
tified and expressed conceptually.
The inherent arbitrariness of a purposive classification
can be explained in general by i) the fact that different
purposes will lead to a different classification and, ii)
even if the purpose is fixed, different justifications can
be provided for what kind of features are most relevant
to that purpose. We wish to stress that we acknowledge
the implicit, constructed (non-natural) dimension of our
approach, following from the fact that it is purposive;
classification of medical ethics can always be presented
by different sets of divided categories (i.e., in this con-
text, sections of a journal). The conclusion we draw
from this is that in order to justify one particular way of
classifying a field of ethics, we must expose the condi-
tions and assumptions involved in doing so. This means
we have to reflect carefully on the criteria that are rele-
vant to a classification, as well as clarify particular
points of view arrived at when trade-offs have to be
made. In doing so, we will be able to justify and specify
requirements that, in turn, will determine the substan-
tive classification at which we will ultimately arrive.
We also recognise that classifying a field of ethics
brings with it the threat of potentially adverse political
and ethical impact (which might indeed be even more
threatening if the classification is mistakenly perceived
as an articulated, natural classification). First, classifica-
tion can be used - deliberately or not - as a tool of
power. Those with the power to classify (for example to
devise sections in a journal of medical ethics or to dic-
tate thematic courses provided in bioethics education)
also have the means to shape both research and educa-
tion (directly or indirectly) through their decisions. If
this is done in a way that merely promotes powerful in-
dividuals’ personal, narrowly defined academic interests,
it can even amount to power abuse. The open invitation
and flexible approach of BMC Medical Ethics to find a
place for articles that are difficult to categorise is an ex-
emplary way to mitigate precisely this kind of threat.
Second, another consequence of classifying the field of
ethics is the risk that issues of ethical relevance fall out-
side, or in between, the defining categories. Such issues
might end up going unpublished (or ignored) if they do
not fit within the sections of the journal or the sub-
disciplines that are taught in educational institutions.
Consequently, there should be an ethical imperative in-
corporated into the business of classifying a field of
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ethics; the classification must be adequate and suffi-
ciently inclusive with respect to ethical concerns that
already exist, and not hinder identification of new issues
that might arise. Again, BMC Medical Ethics provides
an example of one way this challenge can be met. By
inviting all kinds of submissions related to the field, and
by being flexible in finding a home for them within the
established sections, inclusivity is promoted.
Third, there is potential for unintended consequences in
the real world. As an example, one should be aware of the
potential ethical consequences stemming from an attempt
to structure the field of ethics through a classification that,
for example, focuses on theoretical approaches. Such a
classification would promote a theoretical approach to
doing ethics that may not accurately reflect the ethical
challenges as they present themselves within particular
contextualized practices (see, for example, Davies et al.
[1]). Similarly, a classification that focuses on practical
contextualised ethics runs the risk of denigrating more
theoretical/abstract ethical reflection. Both these kinds of
approach have import and value, and any kind of classifi-
cation that leads to one being seen as less valuable than
the other risks committing a wrong insofar as it begins to
delegitimise other practices for no good reason. As a con-
sequence, the academic goods that might flow from a hav-
ing a variety of research practices might be lost, alongside
the potential loss of impactful ethics research. Certainly,
such unfortunate consequences cannot be accurately pre-
dicted, and are far from certain, but it may nonetheless be
a good idea to be mindful of unintended consequences.
To summarise, in order to be perceived as justified, a
classification strategy must expose the purpose of the
classification, identify and make explicit the premises
and assumption behind the classification, and explore
trade-offs and explicit viewpoints taken towards these
premises. As we see it, any approach to classifying the
field of medical ethics for some strategic purpose
should also be accompanied with self-reflective aware-
ness of the three inherent threats described above:
power abuse, inadequate coverage of the field, and nega-
tive unintended impact on practice. From this, substan-
tive constraints on how to shape and determine a
classification are derived. In the following, we will at-
tempt to demonstrate how to do exactly that. We start
by declaring the purpose of our classification, followed
by laying out our initial reflections on a variety of
premises for a purposive classification of medical ethics
before deriving sections that are intended to adequately
cover the whole field of medical ethics. We will then re-
turn to consider the threats described above and assess
our suggested classification of medical ethics accord-
ingly. Finally, we discuss the pros and cons of this the-
oretical approach compared to the practical deliberative
approach used by the journal.
The purpose of our theoretical classification of
medical ethics
The importance of being clear about the purpose and
process of a classification, and the challenges therein, is
underscored by a recent attempt to develop a typology
of bioethics by the American ‘Association of Bioethics
Programme Directors’, as outlined in a recent paper in
the Hastings Centre Report [2]. The authors’ purpose
was to develop a typology that would assist in measuring
success in Bioethics. As such, the typology proposed was
based on differentiating the aims of different kinds of
bioethics scholarship and the associated methods. Crit-
ical voices were published alongside the article, which
challenged both the process, the scope, and the concep-
tual starting point and the purpose/value of the classifi-
cation activity [3–6].
The general purpose of our theoretical classification is
to conceptually divide the field of medical ethics into
distinct sections that will be of use to stakeholders,
which may include different journals, authors, readers,
funders, educators and students. As such, our purpose is
fundamentally different from that of the internal exercise
for BMC Medical Ethics, which was focused on editorial,
author and reader interests specific to that journal.
In this reflection we explore how we might develop a
classification of the field that is unambiguously articu-
lated and relevant and useful to journals, educators and
funders. Bearing in mind the critical voices directed to-
wards the paper by Matthews et al. [2], the challenge is
to avoid categories that are too narrowly defined, and to
ensure that the final classification encompasses every-
thing that could reasonably be defined as medical ethics.
‘Scientific’ versus ‘Non-Scientific’ medical ethics
Since our purpose is to classify work on medical ethics
in a way that can be used by, inter alia, journals and
funders, the structures of classification must be compat-
ible with a distinction between what counts as ‘research’
and what does not in the field of medical ethics. This
will inevitably put some constraints on how we define
the field, making our purposive classification perhaps
more useful to journals, research funders and research
led educators. Clearly, medical ethics does not become a
research activity simply by being discussed by someone
who is described as a ‘researcher’. More fundamentally,
there must be a distinction between bona fide research
and the mere expression of an opinion on an ethical
matter.
We do not aim to contribute to on-going philosophical
debates about the scientific nature of morality and eth-
ics. Our aim here is much more modest; we will only
point out a few uncontroversial characteristics of what
would reasonably qualify as research in the field of med-
ical ethics, and we make no claim that the list is
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exhaustive or authoritative. We state that research in
medical ethics, understood as work that aims to contrib-
ute something new to the canon of knowledge, should
be subject to a minimum of elementary criteria that
apply to any kind of written work claiming to be’re-
search’. If empirical data are involved, the study-design
should be valid, the study should be (in principle) replic-
able to allow for critical scrutiny, and the conclusions
should logically follow from the premises (for example,
see Mertz et al. [7]). If the research is primarily theoret-
ical, crucial assumptions should be clarified and claims
should be consistently justified with arguments. If the
work does not comply with these formal criteria for re-
search, there are reasons to question the value of what is
presented and the extent to which it can make a valuable
contribution to our knowledge. As a very general claim,
we take it that our general classification of the field
should be formulated so as to cover any work on ethics
enjoying a ‘research status’ according to these listed
criteria.
From this general claim, a more substantial constraint
on the classification of the field follows. In so far as
medical ethics is understood as research, the field will
also have to include self-reflexive, theoretical work on
how to establish knowledge in ethics (i.e., how to deter-
mine the validity of ethical work), the relation between
theory and practice when it comes to establishing justi-
fied knowledge, logical structures of justifying theories
versus practical conclusions, conceptual analysis, and
strategies for reaching a well justified classification of a
particular field of ethics (like we attempt in this editor-
ial) etc. Consequently, a classification of the whole field
of medical ethics research needs to include sections that
encompass philosophical, sociological and meta-ethical
work on the conditions for medical ethics as a research
activity itself.
Ethics of practical approaches in ethics research
The previous paragraph on basic criteria for research re-
lates to a fundamental question about the nature of
medical ethics and paths of justification. While philo-
sophical ethics is subject to theoretical constraints shap-
ing the training of philosophers, the academic field of
medical ethics is multi-disciplinary and includes re-
searchers with training in various disciplines and
methods. Does this fact detach this particular field of
ethics from the logics that structure the justification of
philosophical approaches?
First of all, there is not extensive agreement on
how philosophy itself should justify its claims about
ethics, neither substantially nor structurally. Let us
concentrate, however, on one crucial question con-
cerning justification within the field of medical ethics:
does the fact that philosophy is not an unquestioned,
authoritative discipline in medical ethics mean that
academic medical ethics can abandon the requirement
for theoretical normative justification, articulated
through philosophical argument? If so, then our clas-
sification must admit a whole range of research activ-
ities on topics of medical ethical interest that do not
engage directly in normative argument. If not, then
we ought to include in our classification only those
research activities that do result in a clearly expressed
philosophical normative argument.
We hold that whilst reflective, theoretical work in-
volved in articulating what goes into the ‘ought’ must
have an essential and authoritative role in the structure
of normative justification, research that does not directly
engage with normative justification can nonetheless be
classified as academic medical ethics so long as it is en-
gaged with exploring and elucidating ethical norms, as-
sumptions or lived moral experience.
Our argument for this is simple. Modern political and
ethical theories rely on the assumption that individuals
are moral equals. People can be confirmed as moral
equals with respect to certain characteristics according
to different normative theories. However, ultimately, it is
the individual’s real world experiences of being treated
as moral subjects and moral equals, despite their differ-
ent characteristics, that constitutes the litmus test of
how sensitive to ethics a society is. Academic work in
support of developing normative solutions to complex
ethical dilemmas cannot - from an ethical point of view
- consistently promote solutions that do not consider or
address the context of the problem or the impact of the
proposed solution [8–10]. Therefore, in order for aca-
demic work on practical medical ethics to be ethical it-
self, it should recognise and respect the fact that
individuals have real world lived moral experiences that
ought to inform our thinking.
Our recognising the values of explicitly considering
people’s experiences, and the value of theoretical work,
has two important implications for our task of classify-
ing the field of medical ethics. First, it stresses the im-
portance of doing empirical research on people’s actual
experiences in order to find acceptable ethical solutions.
So, in our classification there must be room for contri-
butions, for example, from social science in revealing
people’s experiences and opinions on medical ethical is-
sues. Second, a crucial task for theoretical approaches
should be trying to understand why people do not feel
like moral subjects and moral equals under certain regu-
lations, to assess the relevancy of these reported experi-
ences (as not everyone claiming to be treated unethically
has reasonable grounds for claiming so) to raise con-
cerns about practices that are accepted and taken for
granted, and to give voice to those who cannot raise
concerns themselves.
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However, in order to preserve medical ethics research
as a normative enterprise, we require non-arbitrary,
context-independent normative theories that can be ap-
plied to concrete settings and be used to help critically
analyse them. Ethical analyses do not emerge in a vac-
uum of interpretative or theoretical understanding, and
ethical theories are needed to help us interpret and
understand ethical experience. Indeed, our sensitivity for
considering and characterising a situation as ethical in
the first place - as well as our capacity to find practical
solutions to these situation - can (at least partly) be ex-
plained according to a familiarity with ethical theories
and general ethical norms. Therefore, our classification
must also accommodate medical ethics research that
deals exclusively with the development of ethical theory,
or analyses that are context-independent.
Theory versus practice
It follows from the previous paragraphs that as a subject
for research, academic medical ethics should be consid-
ered to encompass production of both empirical and
theoretical knowledge, but always with a view to inform-
ing normative argument. We argued above that theoret-
ical (or philosophical) approaches are authoritative
compared to empirical findings when it comes to pre-
serving the essential normativity of academic medical
ethics. It does not follow from this, however, that de-
rived, theoretical knowledge in medical ethics should be
considered to enjoy some kind of epistemic superiority
compared to practical knowledge arising in the lived and
experienced real world practice. Rather, medical ethics
research must address the different conditions for pro-
ducing theoretical and practical knowledge respectively,
and theoretical and practical work on ethics should be
assessed according to these conditions respectively [11].
Consequently, a classification of the whole field of med-
ical ethics should not only encompass both theoretical
and empirical research but also reflect that there is a dif-
ference between arriving at academic conclusions at the
desk, and arriving at practical conclusions (i.e., actions)
embedded in real world practices. An adequately justi-
fied classification requires that one takes a stance to-
wards - and provides a description of - how to perceive
the relationship between academic work and impact on
practice.
In our view, the relationship between real world prac-
tice and academic medical ethics can be considered as
inherently dependent on each other. Real world practice
can crucially influence a) the relevance of the subjects of
academic approaches (by informing about what is at
stake from a practical point of view), and b) the accu-
rateness of the theoretical reflection (by providing con-
textualized facts). On the other hand, ethical theory and
conceptual analysis can impact ethical practice by c)
increasing stakeholders’ awareness of (sensitivity to) eth-
ical claims, and d) structuring their practical conclusions
according to justified norms. This means that an ad-
equate classification of the field of medical ethics must
reflect that theoretical work and empirical work on real
world practices (broadly understood to encompass ac-
tual experiences of decision making around ethical di-
lemmas, experiences of not being treated as moral equal
as well as more general concerns and challenges) are not
merely relevant to the field of medical ethics; they are
also interdependent. This puts further constraints on
how the sections of our theoretical classification should
be presented; namely that they should be presented in a
way that reflects an equal importance and not a
hierarchy.
Classification: thematic perspectives versus
universal features of academic work?
Finally, an adequate purposive classification requires that
the categorised sections do not overlap with others in
crucial respects. This means that the sections have to be
structured with respect to a specific criterion or a set of
distinct, but consistently defined, criteria that reflects a
particular organisational strategy. Let us consider two
ways of doing this. On the one hand, a categorisation of
relevant issues in medical ethics can be presented ac-
cording to substantive thematic issues. The theme is the
specific criterion while thematic sections can be orga-
nised in different ways, e.g., according to historical de-
velopment, local geographic concerns etc. Such a
classification will then rely on contingent features (fea-
tures that empirically could have been different). On the
other hand, the classification can be structured by a set
of universal (non-contingent) features of academic work,
e.g., whether it is purely theoretical, applied theory on a
general or a particular issue, reports on empirical experi-
ences and perceived challenges of stakeholders in a par-
ticular setting etc.
When classifying the field of medical ethics into dis-
tinct sections, these sections might overlap, either with
respect to contingent substantial themes (if we chose to
structure the categorisation according to universal fea-
tures of academic work), or vice versa. Thus, we need an
argument for choosing one structuring strategy over the
other.
Again, our argument is simple. There is an important
reason to go with the strategy of categorising according
to non-contingent features of academic work rather than
to distinguish categories with respect to substantial
themes. The field of medical ethics is not static; it de-
velops dynamically in response to new compositions of
contextual features that arise or new technology that is
developed etc. Categorising the field of medical ethics
according to already existing themes limits our capacity
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to recognise and find a suitable home for academic work
on themes that have yet to be acknowledged or
conceived.
Summing up: justified constraints on the
classification of medical ethics
We can now sum up several constraints on our theoret-
ical classification drawn from the previous discussion.
These constraints shape the classification along two dif-
ferent dimensions. Some constraints put formal restric-
tions on how the sections should be presented in order
to expose their relative level of importance, as well as to
avoid overlap between the emerging sections. Others
point out substantial areas of the field that must be cov-
ered by a classification. We start with the formal con-
straints followed by the substantial areas to be
presented.
First, classification of the field of medical ethics should
be structured according to characteristic features of aca-
demic approaches, rather than by themes, in order to
keep the categories flexibly open to new issues arising in
rapidly and constantly developing conditional frames of
medical ethics. This is not to say that we cannot explain
and illustrate the sections with reference to particular
themes. The point is that thematic descriptions should
not misleadingly be presented as independent criterion
for classification alongside the features of academic ap-
proaches; such a mixed presentation messes up the logic
of avoiding overlap that is putatively secured by choos-
ing one comprehensive strategy in the first place.
Second, the inherently practical structure of medical
ethics requires a mix of both empirical and theoretical
work. The sections in this theory-derived classification
approach will have to reflect the constraint that these
different approaches are formally considered to enjoy
relatively equal importance in the field. A way to do this
is to include approaches that can be characterised as pri-
marily theoretical or empirical in distinct sections, and
allow crossover that accommodates blending or integra-
tion of theoretical and empirical work.
Third, a substantive classification of the whole re-
search field needs to include sections that encompass
explorations of the conditions for medical ethics as a
research activity itself, and this will broadly include
theoretical discussions on how to establish knowledge
in the field, conceptual analysis and methodological
development. Proposed methodology in medical ethics
would be based on such fundamental theoretical,
meta-ethical work. This means that fundamental epis-
temological discussions and discussions about substan-
tive methodology logically belong to different levels of
justification; i.e., methodology can be derived from
epistemological theories while epistemological know-
ledge cannot be derived from methodology. For
practical reasons it may be reasonable to present all
these kinds of theoretical work within the same cat-
egory. For the theoretical reasons just mentioned, how-
ever, regarding logical derivation, one should be
careful not to describe such an overall category in
terms of the least fundamental level of justification
(i.e., ‘methodology’) and indicate that the rest of the
work can be seen subordinated to this term. The logic
of derivation suggests it should be the other way
around, whereas linguistically and conceptually a cat-
egory of ‘methodology’ is easily understandable and
would, at a common sense level, include epistemology
as a necessary component of methodological discus-
sion. Where logic and common sense approaches ap-
pear to clash, a compromise position may make sense;
using a description broad enough to encompass any
level of justification. The simplest way of doing so
might be to label the category ‘epistemology and
methodology’.
Fourth, as a substantial requirement there must be
room in our theoretical classification for contributions
of social sciences in revealing people’s experiences and
opinions on medical ethics, and other disciplinary per-
spectives that do not deal explicitly with normative
philosophical argument. This might best be described as
‘studies in empirical/interdisciplinary ethics’. The object
of research may be, for example, empirical data, legal
analysis, or even sociological perspectives on the field of
medical ethics.
Fifth, the classification must also cover academic work
that primarily addresses contextualised, empirical prac-
tices in medicine and health promotion from a theoret-
ical point of view. This kind of work might be
categorised as ‘context-dependent theoretical ethics’.
This also indicates that empirical facts may be crucial
components of this kind of academic work, while keep-
ing open the question of to what extent, and in what
way, the discussion is empirical/contextualized. (i.e., it
allows for a range of methodological variation).
Sixth, to adequately cover the field of medical ethics
research, our classification will have to include work
that focuses on ethical theories or approaches that are
context-independent as well. This would cover norma-
tive theories that present general ethical principles
relating to medicine that in turn can be fed into
context-dependent theoretical work, or ethical analysis
of issues that are performed solely using theoretical
approaches. This category can thereby be labelled
‘theory and analysis’.
Theoretical classification of ‘medical ethics’
We can now sum up our theoretically derived classifica-
tion of medical ethics:
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 Studies in empirical/interdisciplinary medical ethics
(descriptive reports on ethical issues and experiences
as perceived by stakeholders)
 Context-dependent theoretical ethics (normative
discussions of practical, empirical issues - informed,
to a varying extent, by empirical data)
 Theory and analysis (theoretical work that justifies
general ethical principles for medicine and health
promotion or applies theory alone to the analysis of
ethical issues)
 Epistemology and methodology in medical ethics
(discussions of theoretical and empirical premises
for establishing ethical knowledge and action
(including conceptual analysis), and discussions of
methodologies) (Table 1)
Does our theoretical classification of medical ethics stand
up to the test of power abuse, inadequate coverage and
negative impact of theory on practice?
Our approach is a theoretically derived classification of
medical ethics, originating from a desire to explore an
alternative to the practical (through iterative deliberative
process) classification adopted by the journal. Clearly,
this interest did not arise in a vacuum of other interests,
and it undoubtedly reflects particular theoretical points
of view, personal experiences and opinions on what we
believe medical ethics should be about that not everyone
will share. If we attempted to make use of our positions
to implement this classification somewhere without any
open discussion, we would be guilty of power abuse. As
it stands, however, we are only presenting it order to ex-
plore and demonstrate the approach-dependent chal-
lenges involved in classifying the field of medical ethics.
It should also be acknowledged that what we have pre-
sented is the product of a collaboration between four
different individuals, all of whom work primarily in dif-
ferent languages. As such, the product of our deliber-
ation reflects the conceptual and linguistic compromises
that were necessary for reaching agreement.
The classification has been developed on the condition
that we can map all medical ethics research into the of-
fered categories in an adequate way. In principle, of
course, we might have overlooked relevant kinds of
research that do not fit into any of our suggested cat-
egories. At this point, we are not in a position to judge
the adequacy of the classification (as we have worked on
it until it seemed adequate to us). From this we draw a
lesson; unlike the deliberative and consensus-based ap-
proach, theoretically derived approaches to classification
of medical ethics seems to require external, critical re-
view and assessment to make sure aspect are not un-
knowingly neglected.
Whether this classification would have unintended
adverse impact on real world practice is of course an
empirical question. We have emphasised the rele-
vance of empirical knowledge in medical ethics and
the integration of empirical knowledge in theoretical
approaches in the two first sections, as well as
emphasising the need for meta-ethical discussions
about the relationship between theory and practice in
the fourth. Therefore, there should not be any undue
bias towards theoretical or empirical understandings
of ethics. We have, however, suggested that ultim-
ately some theoretical understanding of ethics might
come prior to being able to use empirical approaches
– and this is a point that is both debatable and
could be interpreted as hierarchical. Similarly, the
point we make about epistemology being logically
prior to methodology may be interpreted as prioritis-
ing philosophical concerns and thus to be making a
political point about the relative importance of ap-
proaches within the academy. This is not intended,
but could almost certainly be read into what we have
said.
Pro- and cons arguments for the theoretically derived
approach
The overall advantage of classifying medical ethics using
a theoretically derived approach would be that the
resulting classification is consistent, and consistently jus-
tified. Moreover, the sections are deliberatively devel-
oped to systematically cover the field as adequately as
possible. The weaknesses in this approach, however, are
not insignificant. This approach results in a cumbersome
overview; it may be difficult to understand (and journals
may forfeit submissions for that reason alone). So this
Table 1 Classifications of ‘medical ethics’ according to the practical, consensus-based and the theoretically driven approach, respectively
Practical, consensus-based approach
to classification of ‘medical ethics’
Theoretically derived approach to classification of ‘medical ethics’
• Ethics in biomedical research
• Ethics in clinical practice
• Ethics in public health, medical law,
and health policy
• Methodology in bioethics
• Studies in empirical/interdisciplinary medical ethics (descriptive reports on ethical issues
and experiences as perceived by stakeholders)
• Context-dependent theoretical ethics (normative discussions of practical, empirical issues
- informed, to a varying extent, by empirical data)
• Theory and analysis (theoretical work that justifies general ethical principles for medicine
and health promotion or applies theory alone to the analysis of ethical issues)
• Epistemology and methodology in medical ethics (discussions of theoretical and empirical
premises for establishing ethical knowledge and action (including conceptual analysis), and
discussions of methodologies)
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approach requires some simplification; but that comes
with the potential cost of losing the adequacy of concep-
tual coverage.
Conclusion
In this article we have aimed to reflect on the possi-
bilities, challenges, and value of classifying the field
of medical ethics. We have developed a classification
shaped by theoretically derived constraints and con-
ditions, which contrasts the practical, consensus-
based approach to structuring the classification used
by this journal. Interestingly, these different ap-
proaches reflect a fundamental tension within the
field of medical ethics itself, i.e., between theoretical
and practical approaches and their different ways of
ensuring validity of their conclusions. The choice of
approach is likely to have implications for how the
field ends up being divided and presented conceptu-
ally (although the results could in principle coincide).
By our assessment, both approaches have their own
strengths and weaknesses respectively. As they follow
their own distinct logics in how to reach a classifica-
tion, it is important to perceive them as incommen-
surable; neither of them indicates critical assessments
of the other. Overall, when it comes to determining
what approach to use to classify the field of medical
ethics, the path and the set of sections chosen by
this journal seem best justified for practical editorial
purposes. The easily understandable labelling com-
bined with the institutionalised flexibility of editors’
judgments in finding the appropriate section for any
article, mitigates against the risk of not covering the
field adequately. Furthermore, the added social - and
educational - value of having the editorial board col-
lectively participating in the discussion about the
classification should not be underestimated. The ap-
proach we have explored here is probably best seen
as a theoretical exploration of the field. Nevertheless,
this exercise has hopefully contributed to important
reflection; there are different approaches to develop-
ing a classification of the field, and these may result
in substantially different, although respectively valid,
categories. Importantly, exploring the potential risks
and weaknesses of each approach is valuable in itself
– encouraging reflexivity and ensuring that people
engaging in classification activity, which might seem
internal and without consequence, are conscious and
mindful of the potential impact of their decisions.
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